Selfishness Level of Strategic Games
Authors: K. R. Apt, G. Schaefer
JAIR 2014 | Venue PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. ... We derive (in Section 3) a characterization result that allows us to determine the selfishness level of a strategic game. ... We use (in Section 4) our characterization result to analyze the selfishness level of several classical strategic games. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Krzysztof R. Apt EMAIL Guido Sch afer EMAIL Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI) Networks and Optimization Group Science Park 123 1098 XG Amsterdam The Netherlands |
| Pseudocode | No | The paper presents theoretical concepts, definitions, theorems, and proofs related to game theory, but does not include any structured pseudocode or algorithm blocks. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide any explicit statements about releasing source code, nor does it include links to code repositories or mention code in supplementary materials for the methodology described. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper analyzes theoretical models of strategic games (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma, Public Goods Game, Traveler's Dilemma, Cournot competition) and does not utilize or provide access to any empirical datasets. |
| Dataset Splits | No | As the paper is theoretical and does not use any empirical datasets, there is no information provided regarding training/test/validation dataset splits. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical in nature, presenting definitions, theorems, and analyses of strategic games. It does not describe any computational experiments that would require specific hardware specifications. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper is theoretical and focuses on mathematical analyses of strategic games. It does not mention any software, libraries, or solvers with specific version numbers that would be needed to replicate experiments. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical, focusing on the mathematical analysis of game theory concepts. Therefore, it does not include details on experimental setups, hyperparameters, or system-level training settings. |