Voter Priming Campaigns: Strategies, Equilibria, and Algorithms
Authors: Jonathan Shaki, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus
AAAI 2025 | Venue PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details
| Reproducibility Variable | Result | LLM Response |
|---|---|---|
| Research Type | Theoretical | We study the dynamics, strategies and equilibria of campaign spending for voter priming in multi-issue multi-party settings. We consider both parliamentary elections, where parties aim to maximize their share of votes, and various settings for presidential elections, where the winner takes all. For parliamentary elections, we show that pure equilibrium spending always exists and can be computed in time linear in the number of voters. For two parties and all settings, a spending equilibrium exists such that each party invests only in a single issue, and an equilibrium can be computed in time that is polynomial in the number of issues and linear in the number of voters. We also show that in most presidential settings no equilibrium exists. Additional properties of optimal campaign strategies are also studied. Whenever a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, we provide an algorithm that is linear in the number of voters to compute it. |
| Researcher Affiliation | Academia | Jonathan Shaki 1, Yonatan Aumann 1, Sarit Kraus 1 1Bar-Ilan University EMAIL, EMAIL, EMAIL |
| Pseudocode | Yes | Algorithm 1: computing Nash equilibrium. Iterate over all possible (nonempty) sets of strictly invested issues Ic I : c C. Algorithm 2: Compute Nash Equilibrium for two candidates. |
| Open Source Code | No | The paper does not provide explicit links to source code or statements about its release. It mentions 'Due to limited space, the full proofs appear in the appendix 2. At arxiv.org/abs/2412.13380' which refers to proofs, not code. |
| Open Datasets | No | The paper is theoretical, modeling voter behavior and campaign strategies. It does not use or evaluate on any specific publicly available datasets. |
| Dataset Splits | No | The paper does not use any datasets for experimental evaluation, therefore, no dataset splits are provided. |
| Hardware Specification | No | The paper is theoretical and focuses on strategies, equilibria, and algorithms; it does not describe any experiments that would require specific hardware, hence no hardware specifications are provided. |
| Software Dependencies | No | The paper describes algorithms and theoretical models without presenting any implementation details that would list specific software dependencies with version numbers. |
| Experiment Setup | No | The paper is theoretical, proving the existence of equilibria and providing algorithms for their computation. It does not conduct empirical experiments, therefore, no experimental setup details or hyperparameters are specified. |