Randomized Social Choice Functions Under Metric Preferences

Authors: Elliot Anshelevich, John Postl

JAIR 2017 | Venue PDF | Archive PDF | Plain Text | LLM Run Details

Reproducibility Variable Result LLM Response
Research Type Theoretical We determine the quality of randomized social choice algorithms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences... We provide new distortion bounds for a variety of randomized algorithms, for both general metrics and for important special cases. Our results show a sizable improvement in distortion over deterministic algorithms.
Researcher Affiliation Academia Elliot Anshelevich EMAIL John Postl EMAIL Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 110 8th Street Troy, NY 12180
Pseudocode Yes Algorithm 1 Optimal randomized algorithm for the α-decisive, 1-Euclidean space... Algorithm 2 Uncovered Set Min-Cover
Open Source Code No The paper does not provide any explicit statement about releasing source code or a link to a code repository for the described methodology. It mentions open-source code in the context of related work but not for its own contributions.
Open Datasets No The paper presents theoretical research on social choice functions under metric preferences. It defines models and proves theorems but does not use or reference any empirical datasets for evaluation.
Dataset Splits No The paper presents theoretical research and does not use any empirical datasets, therefore, no dataset split information is provided.
Hardware Specification No The paper is theoretical and does not involve experimental runs on specific hardware. Therefore, no hardware specifications are mentioned.
Software Dependencies No The paper is theoretical and focuses on algorithm design and proofs. It does not mention any specific software dependencies or versions required for implementation or experimentation.
Experiment Setup No The paper presents theoretical work on randomized social choice functions and distortion bounds. It does not describe any experimental setup, hyperparameters, or training configurations.